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Cooperatives throughout North America are consolidatingat an increasing rate and
for avariety of reasons. While many cooperatives merge with others or are acquired to
achieve greater economies of scale, several fail due to changes in the external economy,
which make them redundant. Often, such redundancy is reflected in a heightened
sense of member dissatisfaction. Many argue that such dissatisfaction is likely to arise
in cooperatives as a result of principal-agent problems. In order to determine whether
or not cooperative managers maintain the same goals as their owners, this study uses
data from a member-survey to compare Alberta cooperative members' objectives with
those theybelieve tobe held by their cooperatives' managers. An econometric model of
the difference between members' expectations and perceptions shows how various so-
cioeconomic variables affect the extent to which these objectives are aligned. The re-
sults of this analysis can help cooperative boards design managerial incentive programs
to better align their goals with those of the cooperative membership.
Introduction
The Agricultural Cooperative Service (ACS) of the United States Department ofAgri-
culture (USDA) reports a variety ofstatistics on the health of the cooperative sector. For
example, duringthe 1980sandearly 1990sthe agricultural cooperative sectorintheUnited
States experienced a period ofrapid consolidation. In 1984, there were 5,782 marketing,
farm supply, andservice cooperatives, butby 1993, there were only4,244-areductionof
27% (USDA 1994). Thesecooperativeswere lost to dissolution 09.9%), merger (23.8%),
acquisition byeithercooperatives or proprietary firms (18.6%), and for a variety ofother
reasons (17.7%). Although similar information on Canadian cooperatives does not exist,
the message to cooperative managers is universal.
While business failure is a common and necessary occurrence in a market economy,
the fact that cooperatives are most often organized to provide service-at-cost means that
they are less likely to be abandoned for pure financial reasons. Sometimes, the changing
structure ofthe agricultural economyor changes in technologymay obviate the need for a
cooperative, but many argue that there are inherent characteristics ofcooperative gover-
nance that are responsible for members' decisions to dissolve their businesses.
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In particular, Porter and Scully (1987); Ferrier and Porter (1991); Staatz (1984); and
Caves and Petersen (1986) argue that principal-agent problems permeate cooperatives to a
greaterextent thanin proprietary firms. 1 Fama (1980) maintains thatproprietary firms with
stock that trades on public stock exchanges are subject to continual scrutiny and perfor-
mance assessment. Cooperatives, on the other hand, have no market for their equity, so
owners have less of an incentive to monitor the actions of their managers. Furthermore,
managerial compensation is oftenbased on the financial performance ofthe firm. At least in
theory, or according to traditional cooperative principles, however, the objective ofa coop-
erative is not necessarily to generate profit, but to provide service, information, and other
non-quantifiable variables. Lacking a common metric from which to design managerial
compensation schemes, cooperative owners are less able to provide incentives to managers
to align their personal objectives with those ofthe organization. Such problems ofmanage-
rial control are examples of what Sappington (1991) describes within the general class of
principal/agencyrelationships.
The objective ofthis studyis to conduct an empirical analysis ofcooperative membersin
Alberta, Canada, in order to determine the extent to which cooperative manager and mem-
ber objectives are aligned. If differences exist, this study seeks to determine what types of
cooperative members are more likely to have negative impressions oftheir managers' perfor-
mance. Specifically, the analysis compares members' expectations ofwhat cooperative ob-
jectives should be with their perceptions ofhow cooperative managers rank the same set of
objectives. If there is a wide divergence between these two, particularly where objectives
that are important to members are not perceived to be important to managers, then this is
interpreted as an indication ofunsatisfactory managerial performance. In these cases, coop-
erative members are less likely to continue to supporttheir cooperatives in difficult financial
times. Armed with knowledge, cooperative boards will be better able to design incentive
plans for managers to achieve the goals of members, or to achieve better understanding
between the principals (members) and the agents (managers) as to the intended economic
role oftheir cooperatives.
The first section of the paper presents a simple economic model of the relationship be-
tween cooperative members and their managers. This framework suggests that member
satisfaction with a manager's performance is likely to vary by member characteristics. The
third section describes an empirical model intended to determine the factors that cause
cooperative members' assessments ofmanagerial performance to be eitherfavorable or unfa-
vorable. This section defines performance interms ofthe ability ofa manager to align his or
her objectives for the organization with those ofthe membership. Presentation and discus-
sion of the results of this model follow in the fourth section, while a concluding section
draws some implications for cooperative governance andstability
Economic Model of Cooperative Owne....Manager Relationships
Relationships between owners and managers of a firm often focus on the fundamental
asymmetry of information between principals, (owners), and agents, (managers). The key
variable that is only partially revealed to ownership by management is the amount ofeffort
(e) management puts forth in trying to achieve management objectives. Owners' net in-
come, or, inthe case ofcooperatives, total netbenefit (B*) rises inmanagerial effort, but falls
in managerial compensation. Managers'salaries are assumed to be proportional to the total
amount ofbenefits that they create, so the problem from the owners' perspective is to choose
an incentive plan (w') that implements the optimal amount of effort (e') from managers in
order to maximize total net benefits (Grossman and Hart 1983):Principal-Agent Relationships in Agricultural Cooperatives 23
(1) B· = maxwE[B(e,E) - w(B(e,E))]
where E is the expectation operator, B is the gross benefits function, and £ is a random
variable. The owners' compensationplan, w'maximizes (1) subject to the managers' partici-
pation constraint (Tirole 1988):
(2) maxeEU[w(B(e,E)),e] 2 Uo'
where Va is the minimumlevel ofutilityamanager requires before he orshe will work for the
firm. Further, the wage contract mustalso be "incentive compatible," ormust induce a level
ofeffort that maximizes the agent's expected utility in (2) for all possible values of e.
The usual implication of this framework is that, ifthe owners are risk neutral, under full
information the owners will provide management with full insurance-ora constant wage,
w (Tirole 1988). However, with a constant wage, individual managers do not necessarily
make decisions in order to maximize the net benefit to cooperative owners, due to the fact
that owners must compensate managers for the disutility of effort. In this simplest case,
suppose that the members' benefit function (assumed to be the same for all members) is
concave in managerial effort, and the managers' compensation scheme is linear in benefits.
Figure 1shows the level ofeffort that owners regard as optimal (e*) and that which manage-
ment is likely to provide (e(rn)) (Gravelle and Rees 1981). Thus, eqUilibrium between the
objective function ofthe manager and owners occurs at a point oflower effort than is opti-
mal from the owners' pointofview. Although this diagram provides aSimple representation
of the problem, analytical solutions of the stochastic version in (1) are less straightforward,
particularly in the case ofcooperatives.
Figure I. Managerial Effort and Member Benefits
B
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For a proprietary firm, the value of £ is attributable to random variation in profit due to
weather, market conditions, orotherfactors. Withcooperatives, however, "benefits" are not
measurable like profits, nor are they single valued like profits. Rather, cooperative benefits
flow from a variety ofsources-favourable prices, assured markets, pooling risks, commu-
nity involvement, or member service, to name a few (Cobia 1989). Furthermore, member
heterogeneity means that the expected contribution to total benefit from each cooperative
activity is likely to be different for each member. As a result, characterizing the optimal
compensation contract becomes doubly difficult. Defining the cooperative "benefit func-
tion" is a necessary first step in this direction.
The idiosyncrasy ofcooperative benefits means that they will differ not only from mem-
ber to member, but the benefits perceived by individual members will differ from those that
are measured by the cooperative's managers. Thus, deviations between the benefits per-
ceived by members, from which the compensation plan is derived, and by managers, with
which the results oftheir efforts are measured, are indicators ofless-than-satisfactory mana-
gerial performance usedin this study To obtain ameasure ofthe difference between the two
benefit functions, define total cooperativebenefits to members, or owners, as (Bo), aweighted
average ofeach ofthe benefits attributed to cooperative membership. Because eachmember
subjectively determines these benefits, perceived benefits offered by the cooperative vary
according to the type ofmember. Member type is determined, in turn, bya vector ofchar-
acteristics such as age, education, off-farm income, or farm size. For member j the total
benefit from belonging to the cooperative is given by:
(3) B/(e,€,8) = L Pib/(ei'€i,8)
i
where bi) is the member oftypej's perception ofthe i'h component ofthe benefit function, Pi
is the weight attributed to the i'h benefit, and 8Jis avector ofcharacteristics describing the jLh
member. Onthe otherhand, cooperativemanagers cannot anticipate the variety ofdemand
from different members, so evaluate their own performance on the basis of the observable
components of the net benefit function alone:
(4) B m(e,€) = L Pibim(ei,€)·
i
This imperfect measure of BO is based upon the measurable performance of the cooperative
in terms of retained surplus, growth rates, market share, or some other indicator. Clearly,
the degree ofmisalignment ofmember and manager objectives depends uponthe size ofthe
difference between each owner's benefit function and the one that determines managerial
behavior.
Defining the effect ofowner-heterogeneity, A(8j), as a multiplicative factor andthe inher-
entrandomness ofbenefits (£) as an additive term provides an expression for the difference
between owner and manager-perceived benefits:
(5) B/ - B m = L p;Cbi;"A(8) + €i - bim) \j j E J,
i
assuming that the weights are the same in each function. The function describing owner-
heterogeneity is interpreted as an indexmeasure ofthe effect ofdifferences in socioeconomic
background among owners on their relative valuations ofthe benefits that cooperatives are
theoretically able to provide. The assumption that heterogeneity canbe explained bysocio-
economic factors is a strong one and is one that is commonly made, but is necessary to
implement the empirical model. To better align the objectives of members or owners andPrincipal-Agent Relationships in Agricultural Cooperatives 25
managers, therefore, the second-best solution to the cooperative members' problembecomes
one of choosing the weights, Pi, in order to minimize the difference between members' and
managers' benefit functions. The first-order conditions to this problem are given as:
(6) b/A(e) + Ei - bim = 0, ViE I.
Solving (6) for the member-index function provides anequation for each cooperative benefit
that shows the ratio of manager to owner perceptions as determined by the member-index
function and a random error term:
(7) A(8
j
) = b m/b/ + v,
where v =-flbt. In this equation, if the value ofA(8j ) is equal to one, then all the difference
between owner and manager perceptions are due to random influences. If, on the other
hand, AC8j ) is not equal to one, then the parameters on the components of 8) show how
owner characteristics are related to the difference in perceptions. Information on the rela-
tionship between Sj and the ratio of perceived benefits can help cooperative owners deter-
mine compensation mechanisms in order to better align objectives ofowners and managers,
thereby reducing the impact ofconflicting objectives on member satisfaction.
Empirical Model of Cooperative Member-Manager Relations
Estimating (7) requires an explicit functional form for A In the absence of any prior
information to the contrary, Ais specified as a linear function ofowner characteristics:
(8) Ri = cxio + cxiJF + cxilO + cxi;A + CXi4E + cxiSS + ei
where: Ri is the benefits ratio, F is farm-size in terms of the number of seeded acres, 0 is the
proportion ofincome earned from off-farm sources, A is owner age, Eis the level ofeduca-
tion, and 5is the level ofsales. In addition to this benefit-by-benefit estimation method, an
aggregate model of the form of (5) was estimated with non-linear least squares in order to
test the hypothesis that A= I. In order for this model to be identified, however, it is neces-
sary to assume that the weights on each of the benefits are fixed and equal to each other.
Each of these models are estimated with survey data from the province ofAlberta, Canada.
The survey sample for this study consists of a cluster of 2,500 individuals chosen ran-
domly from a list of subscribers to the Western Producer, an agricultural newspaper pub-
lished by the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool. This sample provides 792 useable responses-a
return rate of 31.7%. Inspection of the data reveals a relatively low proportion of young
farmers, a relatively high education level, and a disproportionate number of large farms.
Although the differences are not large, they may still bias the results somewhat. The indi-
vidual questions measuringrespondents' evaluation ofcooperative performance are given in
the appendix.
Survey respondents are asked two questions concerning their cooperatives' goals. The
first asks howimportant(l=very important, 7=not important) membersbelieve cooperative
managers regard a particulargoal. The second asks howimportant members thinkcoopera-
tive managers should regard the goal. Cooperative goals include each ofthe potential ben-
efits that cooperatives are theoretically able to provide relative to their proprietary rivals.
These include favorable prices, memberinput, productvariety, service quality, expertadvice,
quality products, education and information, proximity, fulfilment ofa social responsibility,
return onequity, community involvement, adherence to cooperative principals, and several
others.26 Journal of Cooperatives 1998
Using the Likert scale responses, the index of "cooperative satisfaction" is created as a
ratio of each member's perception of the degree of importance management places on a
particular goal over the member's own expectations ofhowimportantthat goal should be to
the cooperative. An indexvalue greater than one, therefore, means that the memberregards
the goal to be more important than he or she believes cooperative management does. A
value less than one implies the opposite: the memberbelieves that cooperative management
regards a particular objective as relatively more important than he or she does. Only if
member and management goals are perfectly aligned will the index value be equal to one.
While both values less than or greater than one indicate a problem in communication be-
tween the two groups, deviations above one are seen as the more onerous, because they
implythat managementis not achieving the goals that the members, as owners, hold impor-
tant.
The responses to this question are analyzed in two ways. First, a simple cross tabulation
shows the index values for farmers in the extreme categories of four socioeconomic vari-
ables: age, off-farm income, sales, and education. By choosing the extreme categories in
each, these tables will show, for instance, how closely aligned the cooperative's goals are to
the youngest farmers and then to the oldest farmers. Similar comparisons are made for each
ofthe othervariables. Second, simple regressions of(8) are specifiedinorderto estimate the
linear relationship between the set ofsocioeconomic variables and the satisfaction index.
Results and Discussion
Fourkey characteristics serving to differentiate groups offarmers consist oftheirage, the
percentage ofincome that they earn from off-farm sources, their level ofeducation, and the
size, interms ofsales, of their farming operation. As the theoretical model suggests, unob-
servable characteristics of the owners and the managers, such as their aspirations or objec-
tives, will determine whether or not the goals ofeach are aligned. While no information is
available on the characteristics of the managers, the cooperative survey provides data on
these member types that act as indicators ofthe extent to which the two groups' objectives
do not agree. First, cross tabulations provide descriptive measures of the effect of each of
these traits, while a more formal statistical model follows.
Table 1shows the value ofthe satisfaction index for the extreme categories ofeach ofthe
member traits and each of the components ofthe cooperative objective function. Compar-
ing the responses of the youngest « 35 years of age) to the oldest (> 55 years) yields some
interesting results. Perhaps the most important criterion by which to judge cooperative
performance is in terms of the price either charged (supply cooperative) or obtained (mar-
keting cooperative). Since a higher index value indicates a greater level of dissatisfaction
with cooperative management, the first comparison in the table shows that, although both
groups are dissatisfied with management goal setting, younger members appear to place a
far greater emphasis on price relative to management than do older members. Differences
between the two age groups are also both statistically and economically significant with
respect to questions regarding variety, customer service, managerial expertise, quality, edu-
cation, proximity, return onequity, andvalue added. Note that this list contains many ofthe
variables that proprietary firms tend to use as strategic factors-price, return on equity,
service, and variety Younger members tend to place a relatively lesser importance on those
items regarded as the non-economic benefits ofcooperatives, such as member control or a
strong voice in the community This result suggests that the business components of a
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nately, this may also reveal a lack of understanding of cooperative principles among the
youngerrespondents--cooperativesare notintended to generate profits, so theirvalue should
be measured by the sum ofall the benefits they provide to producers.
Table I. Satisfaction Index byAge, Off-Farm Income, Sales, and Education
Age ofMember Off-Farm Income Farm Sales Edncation
Objectivea < 35 > 55 0% > 75% < 50,000 >250,000 Gr. 8 College
Priceb *2.349 1.604 1.866 1.748 1.793 2.023 1.764 1.546
Inpnt 1.704 1.569 *1.852 1.625 *1.586 2167 1.725 1.759
Variety *1.624 1.268 1.409 1404 1.352 1.498 1.352 1.445
Service *1.870 1.445 1.703 1.726 *1.549 2130 *1.457 1.759
Expertise *1.906 1455 1.781 1.639 *1.540 2.186 *1.492 1.919
Quality *1.820 1.378 1.577 1.663 *1.434 1.927 1.417 1.523
Education *1.776 1.357 1.632 1.567 1.495 1.744 *1.312 1.680
Control 1.508 1.363 1.609 1485 1.419 1.669 1.487 1.803
Proximity *1.423 1.135 1.345 1.442 1.349 1.353 1.142 1.282
Social Role 1.203 1.145 1.192 1.118 1.126 1.241 *1.281 0.935
ROE *1.745 1.420 *1.814 1.580 *1.442 2.172 1.489 1.615
Comm. 1.129 1.105 1.213 1.208 1.107 1.278 1.215 1.044
Valne *1.599 1.308 1.594 1.667 *1.445 1.898 1.322 1475
Principles 1.423 1.314 1.428 1.503 1.371 1.409 1.441 1.361
N 61 322.00 343.00 98.00 224.00 118.00 73.00 79.00
'Note: variable definitions are found in the appendix. Avalue less than one indicates member regards
the objective as less important than he or she believes cooperative management does. Avalue greater
than one suggests that the member believes cooperative managers hold the objective to be less impor-
tant than the member does.
bAsingle asterisk indicates that the means are significantly different at a 10% level using at-test for the
equality of means. The critical t-value is approximately 1.64 in all cases.
In fact, this is part of a more general result that reflects a common theme among the
various questionsasked-youngerfarmers are moreconcernedwith"bottomline" andbusi-
ness performance issues than are older farmers. Many of these younger farmers were not
party to the creation ofthe cooperative, so see little value in maintaining the cooperative for
other than purely economic purposes. Therefore, it is, perhaps, not surprising to find that
younger farmers are more likely to regard cooperative goals that do not concern financial
viability as irrelevant. For instance, the two age groups differ in their assessment of
management's ability to meet the service goals set by members. While younger members
tend to think that management does not regard service as very important relative to mem-
bers' needs, olderfarmers are less critical. Oldermembers are also more likely to believe that
management holds product quality equally as important as members do. In fact, younger
members have a 32% higherindexvalue, indicating that theybelieve the cooperative places
too little emphasis on quality and productimage. Again, this reflects the higherstandard of
commercialism among the younger members.
Younger members appear to not only value the social aspects of cooperatives less than
the other age groups, but indeed to believe that cooperative management places too much
importanceonsocial objectives, although the mean responses from these two age groups are
not statistically different at a 5% level. Point estimates ofthe mean responses to questions28 Journal of Cooperatives 1998
regarding the role ofcooperatives in the community and the adherence to traditional prin-
ciples also show a greater ambivalence from younger members, but again these differences
are not statistically significant. Perhaps portending continued erosion of the traditional
cooperative, youngermembers do not regard cooperative principles as beingas important as
do oldermembers. Given the aging farm population, these results shouldbe ofvital interest
to cooperative boards, but age is by no means the sole factor determining the degree of
dislocation between cooperative members and their managers.
With the increasing bimodal distribution of farm sizes in the United States comes a
widening reliance on off-farm income sources between large and small farmers (Hallberg
1992). This creates a fundamental problem for cooperatives: with a one-member-one-vote
system of control, the greater number ofsmall producers often control the decision making
process, but the larger members are responsible for a growing proportion of the value of
cooperative output. Therefore, it is critical to knowthe areas inwhich the objectives ofthese
two groups differ from those ofthe current management. As table 1shows, compared to the
age classification, farmers in different off-farm income groups tend to be relatively homog-
enousintheir assessment ofcooperative performance. Perhapsnotsurprisingly, the areas of
greatest difference are in the profit and control aspects of management. Respondents that
earn a large proportion of their income off farm are less likely to be interested in active
control of the cooperative, and may, in fact, regard using the cooperative as the convenient
alternative. Respondents that rely on farming for all of their income are also more dissatis-
fied with the lack of focus on price and return on equity-a result that is to be expected if
they rely on the cooperative for their well being.
Perhaps surprisingis the symmetrybetween the two groups with respect to the settingof
social objectives bycooperative management. While bothgroups perceive their cooperative
as treating social goals too lightly, neither is more critical than the other. Assuming that the
group with less off-farm income is more likely to be composed offull-time farmers onlarger
commercial farms, it would seem reasonable to expect them to place greater value on busi-
ness objectives and to place less value on the non-business aspects of the cooperative. On
the other hand, those with little off-farm income are also likely to be more dedicated to the
viability ofthe traditional farm business and, consequently, more willing to lookbeyond the
purely economic roles ofthe cooperative. Off-farm income, however, does not capture dif-
ferences in perceptions between farmers of different size.
ClaSSifying farms by sales level facilitates the farm-size comparison. Many would argue
that larger farmers are more likely to place a greater importance on the business aspects of
cooperatives and less on the social role. Because they also have a lesser need for cooperative
marketing or input purchasing, they are also likely to be more critical of managerial goal
setting. In fact, table 1 shows this to be very much the case. While the satisfaction index
value for large farmers is only 0.23 points higher than for small farms on the question of
price, it is fully 0.73 pointshigher for return onequity. In otherwords, large farmers believe
that cooperatives should regard profitability goals to be far more important than they do.
This dissatisfaction among larger members extends beyond financial management of the
cooperative to marketingvariables. While relatively equallysatisfied with the prioritygiven
product diversity, larger farmers tend to be highly critical ofmanagement's determination of
service, expertise, quality, and value added objectives. Larger farmers also demand more
member input than do their smaller counterparts. While the level of farm sales provides a
proxy measure for the relationship between capital investment and cooperative assessment,
differences in human capital investment are also important.Principal-Agent Relationships in Agricultural Cooperatives 29
Although there is ahigh degree ofheterogeneity inmember education, some tendencies
shouldbe clear. Presumablyaware ofa greater range ofmarketingandinputsupply alterna-
tives, members with higher education may be more demanding of their cooperatives. In
fact, the opposite appears to be true inmany cases. In particular, members with less educa-
tion tend to take less favourable views ofmanagement's price settingpriorities. However, the
opposite is true of the complementary measure of financial performance-more-educated
members think that management should focus more on the return on equity (ROE), al-
though neither the price nor ROE results are statistically different between the two groups.
Despite this seeming contradiction, their attitudes toward non-pecuniary issues appear to
be more consistent. Members with ahigher level ofeducation tend to expect ahigher qual-
ity of service and expertise from the cooperative staff. Somewhat surprisingly, the more
educated members tend to contradict the younger respondents in terms of the social and
communityinvolvement ofthe cooperative. In fact, the "social role ofcooperatives" provides
the only instance where the indexvalue falls below 1.0. More-educated members, it seems,
would like their cooperatives to differentiate themselves more from proprietary firms on the
basis oftheir roles as social institutions rather thansimply places to do business. While this
cross-tabulation suggests many differences inthe benefits perceived byindividual members,
equation (5) requires a parameterization of these relationships in order to weight the indi-
vidual benefit elements.
Simple linear regressions ofeach benefit-indexvalue onthe member traits provides such
a parameterization. Because the explanatory variables in this model are categorical, except
for seeded acreage, each observation assumes the value ofits category midpoint. Although
this approach is standard, Kmenta (1986) derives an estimatorfor the amount ofbias due to
this approximation. If the values of the explanatory variables are uniformly distributed
within each category, the amount ofbias is small. To the extent that the survey data deviates
from this requirement, the regression results may be biased.
The first regression consists ofa non-linear specification of (5) designed to test the null
hypothesis that A= 1. Using a likelihood ratio test, the value ofthe test statistic is 277.517,
so the null hypothesis is easily rejected. This implies that the difference in the aggregate
indexvalue ofmanagers and cooperative owners is due to factors otherthansimple random
variation inthe indices. Onamore intuitive level, this result means that there is asignificant
difference between the objectives of owners and managers, and this difference is a function
of the characteristics of the owners. Estimating the first-order conditions to the owners'
problem provides more detailed information on the factors associated with a divergence
between cooperative member and manager objectives.
These constitute the second set ofregressions, the results of which are shown in table 2.
Specifically, these equations parameterize the relative importance ofthe factors contributing
to the ratio of members' expectations of cooperative goal setting and their perceptions of
managers' priorities. The characteristics consist ofseeded acreage, the percentage ofincome
earned from off-farm sources, the level of farm sales, farmer age, and the highest level of
educational attainment.30 Journal of Cooperatives 1998
Table 2. OLS Estimates ofCooperative Objectives and Member Characteristics
Objective Acreage Off-farm Age Education Sales Constant R2
Income
Price' 0.0009 -0.0019 -0.0128** -0.0386 -0.01l0 3A014** 00265
0.2840) (-0.9381) (-4.0860) (-1.6480) (-1.7740) (87940)
Input 0.0004 -0.0014 -0.0066** -0.0260 0.0019 2.6079** 0.0104
(05739) (-0.7103) (-2.1104) (-1.1020) (0.3066) (6.6900)
Variety 0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0073** -0.0065 -0.0010* 2.1674** 0.0199
(8090) (-0.2365) (-3.1880) (-0.3774) (-2.2520) (76560)
Service 0.0001 0.0056 -0.0103** 0.0067 0.0005 2.3014** 0.0247
(0.1870) (0.3034) (-35880) (03115) (0.9039) (6A320)
Expertise 0.0003 -0.0009 -0.0111** 0.0126 00006 2.3216** 0.0324
(0.4691) (-OA746) (-3.8430) (0.5837) (1.0840) (6A930)
Quality 0.0004 0.0016 -0.0069** 0.0037 0.0005 1.9739** 0.0206
(0.6997) (0.9923) (-2.8010) (0.2018) (1.0410) (6A750)
Education -0.0007 -0.001l -0.0093** 00035 0.0010 2.3297** 0.0166
(-1.0930) (-0.6062) (-3.2250) (0.1612) (0.1734) (65160)
Coutrol 0.0008 -0.0030 -0.0060 0.0212 -0.0010 1.9524** 0.0108
(1.0620) (-1.4630) (-1.8610) (08722) (-1.6250) (48660)
Proximity 0.0008 -0.0084 -0.0084** 0.0138 -0.0013** 1.9546** 0.0273
OA51O) (-0.5567) (-35900) (0.7854) (-2.7870) (67340)
Social -0.0001 -00004 -0.0014 -00277 -0.0006 1.6368** 0.0056
(-0.0301) (-0.2825) (-0.Q705) (-1.8760) (-0.1543) (67110)
ROE 0.0004 -0.0009 -0.0104** -0.0108 0.0005 2.5697** 0.0216
(05471) (-OA220) (-3.2960) (-OA534) (0.8520) (65460)
Community 0.0002 -00005 -00033 -0.0184 -0.0003 1.7690** 0.0064
(OA990) (-OAI70) (-1.7460) (-1.3080) (-0.9077) (76020)
Values 0.0001* 0.0023 -0.0096** -00130 -0.0002 2.3209** 0.0382
(2.7340) 0.4650) (-3.9100) (-0.7090) (-05089) (76300)
Principles 0.0004 0.0005 -0.0009 -00155 -0.0008 1.7676** 0.0056
(06108) (0.2840) (-00353) (-0.7847) (-1.4570) (5AI20)
'T-statisticsare inparentheses. Asingle asterisk indicates significance at a 5% level, andadouble asterisk
indicates significance at a 1% leveL Dependent variable definitions are given in the appendix.
Although the explanatory ability ofeach model is quite low, this is not atypical ofcross-
sectional studies, and it is sufficient to reveal some definite patterns in the survey data.
Clearly the most important factor influencing members' dissatisfaction with their coopera-
tive managers is the age of the respondent. Consistent with the findings of the summary
statistics above, nowhere is this more clear than with respect to the price question. For
example, with all regressors set equal to zero the constant term in the price equation indi-
cates an index ofdissatisfaction of3.401, implying that respondents believe their managers
do not consider favourable prices nearly as important as members do. However, this index
falls byabout 0.013 peryear ofage. While this is notenough to cause the oldestmembers inPrincipal-Agent Relationships in Agricultural Cooperatives 31
the sample to contradict the younger, it is still a significant effect. Education and level of
sales are also significant determinants (at a 10% level) of the difference between members'
perceptions and theirexpectations ofcooperative goals. However, memberswith more edu-
cation or larger farms tend to think that cooperative managers' price goals are more in line
with their own. This result perhaps reflects these members' greater understanding of how
market prices are determined and a lesser sense ofbeing disadvantaged economically
Older members also more favourably regard cooperatives' performance with respect to
allowing member input. Due to the structure of cooperative organization, older members
are more likely to be involved in governing the cooperative, so are more likely to feel that
theirinputis valued. Similarly, oldermembers feel the cooperative betterreflects their goals
for productvariety than do younger members. Withrespect to the varietyvariable, attitudes
offarmers with different farm sizes dependuponhowsize is measured-inacreage terms, or
in terms of dollar value of sales. In terms of seeded acreage, larger farmers tend to have
negative views of cooperative performance, while farmers with more sales tend to have
favourable views ofcooperatives' variety goals. Objectives ofservice, quality, expertise, and
education all follow patterns similar to member input. Namely, age is the only significant
influence onperformance assessment with older farmers takingamore positive view oftheir
cooperative managers.
Farmers with a greater share of their income earned off farm tend to be more closely
aligned with cooperative management on the issue of member controL Because of their
greater dependency on sources other than the cooperative for their livelihood, these mem-
bers are more likely to cede control to management than to expect to have an active role.
This observationis also true offarms that are larger interms ofsales. Perhaps this reflects the
movement in recent years toward more volume discounts and proportional representation
within the cooperative. These members are beginning to feel that their greater economic
importance has animpact oncooperative policy. Not surprisingly, age is again animportant
factor (at a 10% level) in the importance of member controL As older farmers have more
time to spend managing their cooperatives, they are more likely to feel a sense of controL
Age is also an important factor in explaining the deviation between members' expectations
andperceptions ofthe importance managers place onproximity. Older farmers appearto be
more satisfied with the importance placed on cooperative location, perhaps because they
occupy the land closest to the market. Those members living on the market fringe would
likely have ceded theirland to newentrantswho are more likely to make aprofitinmarginal
areas. Larger farmers also tend to disagree with cooperative management less on the impor-
tance of proximity as compared to smaller farmers. Larger farmers capture a significant
amount of their economies of scale through transportation savings-an advantage that is
lost if they are far from the closest market.
Neither age nor farm size affects the assessment of cooperatives' roles in society. On
questions concerningsocial involvement withother members, the role ofthe cooperative in
the community, and the adherence ofthe cooperative to the basic principles, only education
has a discernible effect. In particular, more-educated members tend to place greater value
on the non-economic cooperative functions, perhaps seeing a greater purpose for agricul-
tural cooperatives than simplymarketing oracquiring goods. With respect to a purely eco-
nomic objective, the importance ofreturn to equity, again older farmers tend to believe their
managers perform well. The same is true for their perception of the value of cooperative
goods. However, farmers with more seeded acres tend to think that their managers under
emphasize the importance of product value. This result reflects the fact that as farms be-
come larger, they derive less benefit from being in the cooperative-ostensibly to obtain
economies ofscale that they can already achieve internally.32 Journal of Cooperatives 1998
Conclusions
Due to the lack of capital market discipline, a clear profit motive, and the transitive
nature ofownership, cooperatives are believed to suffer from principal-agent problems to a
greater degree than proprietary firms. Issues of corporate governance may contribute to
many ofthe problems that cooperatives are nowexperiencinginmaintainingmember com-
mitment and in satisfying an increasingly diverse constituency Understanding the factors
that contribute to this problem is critical for cooperative managers and boards ofdirectors.
This study presents an analysis of Alberta agricultural cooperative member evaluations
ofcooperative managerial performance. Management performance is measured by compar-
ing members' perceptions ofthe goals actually set for the cooperative with their ownexpec-
tations ofwhat the goals shouldbe. Specific goals include a favourable price, qualityservice,
return on equity, and several others. An index created by subtracting an ordinal ranking of
expected priorities (I=important, 7=not important) from perceived priorities provides a
measure of"member satisfaction."
Comparingvalues ofthe index for each goal byage group, level ofoff-farm income, sales
level, and educational attainment provides some explanation for the extent to which coop-
erative member and manager objectives do notagree. In particular, younger farmers believe
that their managers do not place enough emphasis on such bottom-line issues as better
prices, a higher return to equity, quality ofservice, or product variety However, this group
believes that managers place too much importance on the social role of cooperatives and
their involvement in the community Members with different proportions of off-farm in-
come tend to view the objectives set by management similarly-those with lower off-farm
incomes tend to place higher importance on the return to equity, but this is only slight.
There are sharp differences, however, between farms with less than $50,000 and those with
more than $250,000 in sales. The latter group is far more critical of the objectives set by
their managers in terms of price, member input, quality of service, staff expertise, product
quality, value added, and particularly the return on equity As with younger farmers, larger
farmers tend to place less emphasis on the social aspects of cooperation. As the level ofa
farmer's education rises, he or she is less inclined to agree with cooperative management's
objectives in terms ofeducation, expertise, and customer service, but tends to align more
closely with the social goals ofcooperative managers.
Regression analysis largelyconfirms these results. By parameterizinga"cooperative ben-
efit function," the study shows that older farmers tend to have a more favourable view of
cooperative performance than do younger ones. Farmers with a higher level of education
are more likely to agree with the cooperatives' non-economic objectives. Furthermore, these
results show that larger farmers, when farm size is measured interms ofseeded acreage, tend
to have a more pessimistic view ofcooperative product variety and value.
Although the results containsome surprises, they do supportsome broad themes. First,
problems ofmember dissatisfaction are more likely to arise among younger farmers as they
do not associate the cooperative with the social movement that it once was. Their only
contact or experience with the cooperative is on purely business terms. Second, the move-
ment of farmers toward off-farm jobs and supplementary income does not seem to affect
their perception of the quality of cooperative management very much. However, larger
farmers tend to believe that cooperative management operates under a separate set ofgoals
from their members. Reflecting their greater appreciation for the business aspect of the
cooperative, the larger farmers are the ones most likely to press for change. Finally, the
extent of member-manager objective disagreement tends to fall with member education in
many respects, but the areas of disagreement are not entirely consistent with the greaterPrincipal-Agent Relationships in Agricultural Cooperatives 33
emphasis on economic issues that one would expect. In fact, the more educated members
tend to align themselves with the social and community roles of the cooperative. Perhaps
this result, more than any other, bodes well for cooperatives in the future as a more highly
trained generation of farmers takes a more long-term perspective of the benefits offered by
their cooperatives.
Note
1. In the cooperative case, owner-members are principals, while the cooperative managers
are agents. The principal/agent problem, therefore, describes "how the principal can best
motivate the agent to perform as the principalwould prefer, taking into accountthe difficul-
ties in monitoring the agent's activities" (Sappington 1991).
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Appendix
The following questions provide the raw data from which the indexofcooperative mem-
ber satisfaction is calculated:
Please indicate your perception ofthe importance this co-op places on each of
the following items:
Very Important Not Important
a. Price ofproduction or services 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
b. Member's input in decision-making process 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
c. Variety ofproducts/services offered 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
d. Customerservice 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
e. Professionalism/expertise ofstaff 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
f. Quality ofproducts/services 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
g. Agricultural education and training 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
h. Member ownership and control in the co-op 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
i. Proximitylconvenience/ease ofuse 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
j. Social relationships with other members 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
k. Return on equity 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Communityinvolvement 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
m. Value ofproducts or services 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
n. Commitment to traditional cooperative ideals 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Now indicate how important you feel these items should be to the co-op:
Very Important Not Important
a. Price ofproducts or services 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
b. Members' input in decision-making process 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
c. Variety ofproducts/services offered 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
d. Customerservice 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
e. Professionalism/expertise ofstaff 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
f. Quality ofproducts/services 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
g. Agricultural education and training 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
h. Member ownership and control in the co-op 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
i. Proximity/convenience/ease ofuse 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
j. Social relationships with other members 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
k. Return on equity 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Communityinvolvement 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
m. Value ofproducts or services 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
n. Commitment to traditional cooperative ideals 1 2 3 4 5 6 7